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The Chinese government has shown an active attitude in 
encouraging and supporting the participation of private 
investors in the provision of public infrastructure and 
services. There is a huge investment opportunity for Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) in China. However, China has 
immature regulatory and institutional PPP frameworks. This 
paper hence aims to review the application of PPP in China 
and consequently draw lessons for future references. It was 
found that China has a wealth of experience with PPP under 
the strong support of central and subnational governments. 
Given the tremendous economic growth and immense demand 
for infrastructure, China will continue to have a massive 
demand for future PPP projects. This paper is important as its 
contribution is to summarize the application of PPP in China in 
terms of opportunities, current usage and future trends.
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INTRODUCTION
A Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is 
defined by The National Council for 
PPPs (2013) as a contractual agreement 
between a public agency and a pri-
vate sector entity, through which each 
sector shares the skills, assets, risks 
and rewards in the delivery of a service 
and/or facility for the use of the general 
public. PPPs present a number of recog-
nized advantages, such as private financ-
ing and project acceleration, integrated 
solution for public services, risk trans-
fer to private sectors, life cycle efficien-
cies, etc. (Chan et al., 2009). Through 
this approach, private sector has been 
playing a significant role in the delivery 
of public infrastructure and services in 
many countries.
The continuous economic growth 
in China has resulted in an immense 
demand for infrastructures. To meet the 
development needs, the Chinese govern-
ment has been proactive in promoting 
private involvement and investment in 
the infrastructure development. On the 
executive meeting of the State Coun-
cil on July 31 2013, Premier Keqiang Li 
stated that the government will continue 
to support the private investments and 
all investment entities will be treated 
equally. The central government also 
claimed to further widen the market 
access of public services to eligible pri-
vate investors with sound credit. It can 
be expected that private investors would 
get more involved in infrastructure devel-
opment via PPPs. However, China has 
often been criticized for having immature 
regulatory and institutional frameworks 
for PPP (Chan et al., 2010). Therefore, it 
is worth examining the PPP application 
in China, in order to derive lessons for 
future references.
This paper hence aims to review the 
PPP application in China. The review pro-
cess was to: 1) examine the PPP opportu-
nity; 2) examine the PPP environment; 3) 
examine the PPP usage; and 4) extrapo-
late the future developments of PPP. The 
sequence of the following sections is 
arranged as per the review process.
PPP opportunity
According to the China’s 12th Five-
Year Plan (2011-2015), China’s annual 
average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth between 2006 and 2010 was 
11.2%, and the urbanization rate grew 
from 43% in 2005 to 47.5% in 2010. 
In the 12th Five-Year Plan, China is 
expected to reach an annual average 
GDP growth of 7% and an urbanization 
rate of 51.5%. In response to the rising 
urbanization, Chinese government is 
expected to continuously promote the 
development of public transportation 
to relieve traffic jams and enhance 
mobility for urban commuters. Other 
public facilities such as water supply, 
gas supply, and waste disposal are 
also in high demand to cope with the 
increasing urbanization. The 12th Five-
Year Plan makes a turning point from 
previous emphasis on headline growth 
to strategies and measures for long-
term prosperity. One of the important 
goals in these five years is to develop 
seven priority industries (i.e. new 
energy, energy conservation and envi-
ronmental protection, biotechnology, 
new materials, new IT, high-end equip-
ment manufacturing, and clean energy 
vehicles). The strategic objective of bal-
anced development among regions and 
urbanization rate increase also creates 
massive infrastructure requirements. 
It is thus understandable that the 
main drivers for adopting PPP in China 
are economy-related drivers. This is 
consistent with the findings of Chan et 
al. (2009) that the top drivers for PPP 
scored by Chinese respondents include: 
(1) to solve the problem of public sector 
budget restraint; (2) to provide an inte-
grated solution (for public infrastruc-
ture/services); (3) to reduce public 
money tied up in capital investment; 
(4) to cap the final service costs; and 
(5) to reduce the total project cost. The 
emphasis on economy-related drivers 
for PPP in China is logical as China has 
a lot more investments and involvement 
in public projects. The government has 
realised that key targets set in the 12th 
Five-Year Plan cannot be achieved if the 
government relies on public financing 
alone, especially given the truth that 
the central and subnational govern-
ments are suffering huge debts of RMB 
123,841.04 Trillion (about US$ 19,777.41 
Trillion) and RMB 178,908.66 Trillion 
(about US$ 28,571.71 Trillion) respec-
tively (National Audit Office, 2013). 
Thus, the Chinese government is con-
tinuing to invite foreign companies and 
domestic private investors to partici-
pate in infrastructure development and 
public services.
Environment for PPP
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2012) 
summarized a benchmark index to 
assess the readiness and capacity of 
countries to carry out sustainable PPPs. 
This index comprises six components: 
1) legal and regulatory framework for 
concession projects; 2) institutional 
framework (design and responsibilities 
of institutions that prepare, award and 
oversee projects); 3) operational matu-
rity (number and success rate of past 
projects); 4) investment climate (busi-
ness, political and social environment 
for investment); 5) financial facilities 
for funding infrastructure; and 6) sub-
national adjustment factor. According 
to EIU (2012), China scored 31.3, 25.0, 
78.1, 51.6, 66.7, and 75.0 out of 100 
in these six components respectively. 
Unfortunately, the reasons behind 
the scores were not sufficiently dis-
cussed in EIU (2012). Therefore, this 
paper will adopt this six components 
index to examine the environment for 
PPP in China and provide more detailed 
discussions.
Legal and Regulatory Framework
Law and regulatory framework for PPP 
is immature and still evolving. EIU 
(2012) rated China 31.3 out of 100 on 
this component. Current PPP regula-
tions are considered to lack a strong 
legal force in the forms of opinions, 
notices and decisions. They were 
issued by the State Council and its 
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ministries, who only took into account 
their own responsibilities. As a result, 
these regulations lack completeness. 
There are currently no mechanisms 
for value for money assessments or 
other decision making frameworks to 
ensure that PPP is the most appropriate 
option. Because of the immense bud-
getary pressure on the government to 
provide infrastructures, the concerns 
regarding efficiency in project procure-
ment and delivery are often ignored. 
The decision to employ PPP is made 
in despite of the specific conditions of 
the target project. In addition, there is 
no formal process for deciding the type 
and extent of government support for 
PPPs. The government officials make 
decision based on their own judgments 
or preferences while the general public 
and even the professionals and aca-
demics have little or no influence on the 
decision-making (Sachs et al., 2007).
Although a feasibility study and 
post-evaluation for a PPP project are 
typically conducted, information rel-
evant to appraisal, project details and 
post-implementation is usually not 
available to the general public. There 
is no obligation for the government 
or the investors to publish contracts 
and their amendments, which are usu-
ally regarded as commercial secrets 
(by investors) or official secrets (by 
governments).
However, there are several improve-
ments in PPP related regulations in 
China. These improvements include 
switching PPP key players from foreign-
ers solely to all private investors, wid-
ening PPP implementation from BOT 
only to diverse models, and providing 
more operational procedure guideline 
(Wang et al., 2012). More importantly, 
the PPP law was identified as one of 
the near future legislations at the 12th 
National People’s Congress in March 
2013. The setup of PPP law is led by the 
Department of Laws and Regulations 
of National Development and Reform 
Commission. The preparation work 
commenced in early 2014.
Institutional Framework
Among the six components, China 
scored the lowest (25.0 out of 100) in the 
component of institutional framework 
(EIU, 2012). This may be due to the fact 
that there are no national PPP-specific 
agencies in China. On May 26 2014, a 
PPP working group was established 
under the Ministry of Finance. However, 
the members of the working group are 
all its subordinates, while its role and 
responsibilities remain unclear.
PPP projects are treated in the same 
way as traditional state infrastructure 
projects. The State Council and its minis-
tries, especially the Ministry of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Development (previ-
ously named Ministry of Construction), 
have issued several PPP regulations in 
the form of opinion, notice and deci-
sion. The National Development and 
Reform Commission and local planning 
commissions are in charge of evalua-
tion and approval of project application 
reports of PPP projects. The Ministry of 
Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
is responsible for the overall admin-
istration of the tendering activities 
throughout the country, while the 
subnational construction authorities 
are responsible for those within their 
own areas. The main tasks of the sub-
national construction authorities are 
to prequalify private investors, review 
calling for tenders and tender docu-
ments, and supervise tender opening, 
tender evaluation and contract award.
There are usually two types of 
administrative arrangement for tender 
evaluation in PPP projects. The first 
form is to set up a separate tendering 
office, which is formulated jointly by 
the construction commission, planning 
commission, fiscal and auditing bureau, 
and other relative departments, with 
the construction commission repre-
sentative as the leader of this office. 
The other form is to employ or create an 
agency entrusted with the whole pro-
cess, which was adopted in Guangxi 
Laibin B Power Project (Wang et al, 
1998). 
Operational Maturity
Even though the regulatory and insti-
tutional frameworks for PPPs are still 
underdeveloped, China has registered 
1064 projects in energy, telecom, 
transport, water and sewerage from 
1990 to 2012 according the World Bank 
Private Participation in Infrastructure 
Project Database (World Bank, 2013). 
An unevaluated number of PPP projects 
is at least 7-8000 from the perspective 
of Dayue Consultant, which is a profes-
sional PPP consultant in China partici-
pating in more than 500 PPP projects 
(National Business Daily, 2014). The 
mismatch between the phenomenal 
experience wealth and the underde-
veloped regulatory and institutional 
frameworks is driven by the high rates 
of economic growth and ambitious 
government plans for infrastructural 
development (EIU, 2012). As a result, 
China has scored the highest in this 
component.
PPP projects are currently handled in 
a similar fashion to state infrastructure 
projects, in which government officials 
do have rich experience developed 
from their exposure to China’s huge 
infrastructure market. The government 
is also keen to employ consultants to 
conduct project financing, risk evalua-
tion, bidding and contract negotiation 
(Ke et al., 2009). In addition, methods 
and criteria for PPP procurement are 
usually the primary focus of current 
PPP regulations in China. Factors such 
as price, technical and financial status, 
credit standing, services, performance, 
and the response to the bid-invitation 
documents are commonly taken into 
account when selecting a private 
partner. 
Although there is yet no official 
guidance on risk allocation in place, 
risk allocations have been basically 
fair between the public and private 
sectors, because of the rich past 
experience (Ke et al., 2012; 2013). In 
addition, the Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development has issued 
several contract samples for PPP, which 
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strongly reinforce the importance of 
performance bonds for bidding, con-
struction and operation. In particular 
on the issue of post-bid opportunism, it 
is typically well prevented by the limita-
tion clauses on project interest transfer 
or price adjustment. 
However, disputes are common 
because of changes in various risks or 
non-performance of obligations, espe-
cially when one sector is imposed to 
accept the requirements by the other as 
a result of the unequal status, the proj-
ect urgency or other reasons (Ke et al., 
2009). One of the common reasons is 
that the new officials reject to perform 
the obligations agreed by their prede-
cessors when there were some changes 
of the head officials who are in charge of 
the project (Sachs et al., 2007).
Investment Climate
According to EIU (2013), the real GDP 
growth will average 6.7% a year in 
2014-18, with economic expansion 
decelerating gradually over the period. 
Continued strong growth and high 
infrastructural demands have created 
a favorable environment for private 
investment via PPPs. In addition, the 
central government has a highly pro-
active attitude towards the adoption 
of private investment in infrastruc-
ture development, as evident from 
the before-mentioned statement by 
Premier Keqiang Li on the executive 
meeting of the State Council on July 
31 2013.
There are no restraints on foreign 
investment in infrastructure projects, 
or any rules of guidelines that suggest 
a preference for companies with local 
capital or foreign investors in gen-
eral. However, closer relationships 
between state-owned or state-holding 
enterprises and the government may 
reflect a greater capability to undertake 
country-level political and legal risks. 
In fact, state-owned or state-holding 
enterprises now have the major market 
share of PPPs (Ke et al., 2009; Wang et 
al., 2012). 
The lure of a sizable market and a 
reasonable operating environment has 
resulted in a significant level of PPP 
application in China. The attractive-
ness of China’s investment proposition 
would continue to be critical. However, 
PPP projects in China come with no 
guarantee of sustainability because 
of weak regulatory frameworks and 
underdeveloped institutions for PPP 
(EIU, 2012). Weak government effec-
tiveness remains a threat to fostering 
sustainable and efficient PPP infra-
structure projects. Therefore, China 
only scored 51.6 out of 100 in the com-
ponent of investment climate.
Financial Facilities
China obtained 66.7 in the financial 
facilities. Responsibility for the imple-
mentation of infrastructure projects 
resides primarily with subnational 
governments. They have insufficient 
capacity to levy taxes and thereby make 
extensive use of off-budget financing 
options for infrastructure. The major-
ity of subnational government debt 
financing is estimated to be financed by 
bank loans, while the majority of these 
loans are provided by the state-owned 
banks. Subnational governments have 
also been increasing their use of bonds 
in recent years. Six local governments 
(Shandong, Jiangsu, Guangdong, 
Shanghai, Shenzhen and Zhejiang) 
now have direct access to bond market 
finance under pilot schemes (Chong 
and Poole, 2013).
In most PPP projects, private part-
ners have the sole responsibility for 
the financing component, although 
they may receive support in the forms 
of government capital grants, loans 
from development banks and credit 
enhancement. Governments have also 
used other methods to encourage pri-
vate participation in PPPs. For instance, 
governments can use mechanisms to 
shield private parties from some of the 
downside risk in the form of take-or-
pay agreement. In certain cases, the 
government can provide subsidies to 
improve access for the poor, using two 
methods. The first way is to subsidize 
investors directly. Taking the Subway 
Line 4 in Beijing for example, in order 
to keep the service price affordable 
for the poor, the government intro-
duced a subsidy mechanism based on 
shadow pricing (Ke et al., 2009). The 
second approach is to subsidize the 
low-income users by using differen-
tial pricing structures. For example, in 
order to encourage private investment 
in the social welfare, the governments 
are willing to provide compensations 
for low-income elderly people in bead 
house projects.
Debt constitutes a large propor-
tion of PPP infrastructure financing, 
which may depend on the stability and 
predictability of cash flows. In China, 
debt financing in a PPP is still made 
up of loans from banks, because the 
syndicated loan market is not preva-
lent as a source of debt finance (Kwok, 
2001), the corporate bond market is 
not sufficiently mature compared with 
sovereign bonds (Yuen, 2004), and the 
arrangement of floating charge on proj-
ect assets as a guarantee needed for 
innovative project financing is not well 
established legally (Li, 2005). 
Subnational Adjustment Factor
In China, subnational governments are 
empowered to develop infrastructure 
assets through PPP at the subnational 
level. China has a provincial- and city-
driven PPP program operating under 
national regulation, but public capacity 
varies significantly across the prov-
inces and cities (EIU, 2012). Therefore, 
China obtained 75 out of 100 in this 
component. 
The central government is respon-
sible for the regulatory framework and 
approval of all major infrastructure 
projects. Subnational governments 
provide the detailed administrative 
measures and take the lead role in 
PPP implementation. For example, 
measures for PPP implementation 
and bidding procedures issued by 
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subnational governments include more 
detailed evaluation criteria. These 
measures on PPP are based on the 
regulations issued by the central gov-
ernment; therefore differences are few 
in essence among these subnational 
frameworks.
Only a few municipal governments 
like Chengdu and Kunming proposed 
to form a PPP-specific commission. 
Municipal Development & Reform 
Commission on behalf of the subna-
tional government usually takes the 
lead role in a PPP project. However, it 
is worth noting that the public capabili-
ties in different cities may vary. Those 
more developed cities like Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangdong, or Zhejiang 
are believed to be much more capable 
than less developed cities (Wang et 
al., 2012).
Usage of PPP
PPP modality was first introduced in 
the Shajiao B power plant, and fur-
thered by subnational governments 
in mid 1980s. Later after 1996, several 
state-approved pilot BOT projects were 
awarded in order to promote BOT on a 
larger scale, such as the Laibin B power 
project and Chengdu No. 6 water proj-
ect etc. Thereafter, the involvement 
of private investors in infrastructure 
development grew rapidly. Although 
at the end of 1990s, coping with the 
adverse effects of the Asia financial 
crisis, the central government invested 
huge amount of treasury bonds in infra-
structure, which meant subnational 
governments could access fund-
ing more easily and did not have to 
depend on private investment. Also, 
during this stage the central govern-
ment was determined to clean up the 
unregulated or illegal projects. This 
led to a fading out of the first round 
of private investment boom (Shen et 
al, 2005). However, stepping into the 
21st century, the bottleneck effect of 
infrastructure shortage for the eco-
nomic growth emerged again and 
imposed great budgetary pressure 
on the subnational governments. As 
a result of that, the second boom of 
private investment began. 
The highest openness has been 
seen in toll road and municipal utilities 
including water, power, environment, 
city gas, etc. Subnational governments 
undertake the investment responsibil-
ity of those sectors with the highest 
openness, while the central govern-
ment is responsible for pivotal railway 
and other special sectors. Subnational 
governments are keener to promote 
PPP implementations than the central 
government. 
There are three main players in the 
PPP market, i.e. foreign enterprises, 
state-owned enterprises and domestic 
private enterprises. Foreign investors 
acting as the major player in the first 
boom usually charge higher and prefer 
projects in more developed regions. 
They may be the most efficient in opera-
tion and management, but is the least 
familiar with the Chinese culture. 
State-owned enterprises as the prin-
ciple player in the second boom have 
relative low operation and manage-
ment efficiency, which largely restrains 
the advantages of PPP model (Ke et al., 
2009). State-owned enterprises have 
the strongest relationship with the gov-
ernment and the strongest capability to 
undertake country level risks. The third 
group of PPP players in China is the 
domestic private enterprises. In recent 
years, the involvement of these enter-
prises has significantly increased. 
Currently, state-owned enterprises 
and state-holding enterprises have 
the highest PPP market share in most 
infrastructure sectors. Domestic pri-
vate enterprises and foreign investors 
are active in sectors such as water, city 
gas, toll road, etc., which promise con-
siderable revenue generation.
Where to from Here
The transfer of power to a new genera-
tion of Chinese political leaders, which 
was completed in March 2013, is not 
expected to lead to any substantive 
change in regards to private invest-
ment in infrastructure development. 
This is evident from “Opinions of 
the State Council on Strengthening 
Urban Infrastructure Construction” 
on 6 September 2013, “Guidance 
for Government Purchases of Public 
Services from Social Organizations” 
by State Council General Office on 26 
September 2013, and “Regulations 
on Urban Drainage and Sewage 
Treatment” by State Council on 2 
October 2013. These newly issued 
regulations show the ongoing positive 
attitude of the central government. It is 
therefore expected to see more private 
involvement in infrastructure develop-
ment in China via PPP mode. However, 
implications may be slightly different 
in different sectors.
In the water sector, sewage treat-
ment and water supply projects are dif-
ferent in their financial self-liquidating 
ratio. The total cost of a sewage treat-
ment plant cannot be covered by the 
wastewater tariff collected, but the 
tariff of water supply usually would be 
able to offer an appreciable return to 
the investors. Therefore, most water 
supply plants in China adopt the mode 
of so-called “Plant-pipeline bundle”, 
which means the water companies col-
lect tariff from end-users. Subnational 
governments would procure sewage 
treatment plants by means of BOT or 
Transfer-Operate-Transfer, and leave 
wastewater pipeline network to be 
invested and operated by government 
itself. Sewage treatment companies 
usually collect fee from subnational 
governments according to their 
treatment volume. The “Regulations 
on Urban Drainage and Sewage 
Treatment” issued by State Council on 
2 October 2013 will standardize and 
promote the private investment in the 
sewage treatment sector.
BOT is the most popular model in toll 
roads, where private investors directly 
collect tariff from passengers. Under 
this arrangement, private operators of 
toll roads undertake the risk of traffic 
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flow volume and consequent risk of toll 
revenue. Because provincial authority 
of road transportation regulates the 
tariff, toll road companies usually fail 
to adjust the tariff based on the opera-
tion cost according to the concession 
agreement (Zhang, 2009). The analysis 
on the operational maturity and subna-
tional adjustment factor could indicate 
that the frequent usage of PPP in toll 
roads will continue in the future.
In the rail transportation sector, 
the most critical issues are the lower 
project financial self-liquidating ratio 
and unclear subsidiary and profit 
mechanisms. These critical issues 
make it much more difficult for private 
participation (except in some dedi-
cated lines with independent tariff 
settlement). The railway sector thus 
has the least openness to the private. 
The same issue has been seen in the 
urban railway development. Hugh 
investment requirement and the low 
fare to accommodate public welfare 
concerns greatly reduce the possibility 
for private investors to obtain reason-
able financial return during operation. 
Further, under current Chinese land 
law it is not allowed for subnational 
governments to grant the land in sur-
rounding areas of stations to the inves-
tors without competitive tendering. 
Subsequently, the integration between 
land use and transportation develop-
ment cannot be achieved. Allowing the 
use of land by the investors around 
stations can not only support a higher 
intensity of urban activities which can 
provide better value for money, but 
also, investors can implement more 
innovative approaches that allows 
them to generate more revenue which 
can compensate the high construction 
costs. As mentioned in the legal and 
regulatory framework section, private 
investments are welcomed in railway 
and urban subway sectors. However, it 
is expected for the government to be 
responsible for part of the construc-
tion, or to provide a subsidy during the 
operation period.
The revenue of a PPP gas project 
comprises the connection charge and 
commodity charge, where the connec-
tion charge is applicable when a user 
accesses to the pipeline network, and 
the commodity charge means the tariff 
on the amount of gas throughput on the 
transmission network. Given the lack 
of governmental fiscal support to the 
construction of pipeline networks, it 
may be reasonable and necessary to 
charge for connection. The main player 
in the construction of networks is still 
and will continue to be state owned 
enterprises. As explained in the sec-
tion “Usage of PPP” that state-owned 
enterprises have the strongest rela-
tionship with the government and the 
strongest capability to undertake proj-
ects with issues of complicated tariff 
mechanisms.
As emphasized in China’s 12th Five-
Year Plan, upgrading social welfare 
and increasing urbanization rate are 
key initiatives. Thereafter, a national 
debate of PPP usage in urban compre-
hensive development, urbanization, 
bead house, low-income housing, etc. 
has been seen. In addition, there are 
limited PPP projects in the education, 
health, security and other social sec-
tors. An increase of PPP application in 
these sectors could be expected in the 
near future.
Another change is seen in the 
national contemplation whether PPP 
is a panacea for infrastructure devel-
opment. China’s demand for more 
public infrastructure and services has 
imposed great pressure on the gov-
ernment’s budget. This hence causes 
the subnational governments’ favor of 
using PPP without carefully consider-
ations on feasibility of PPP. But the cen-
tral government has realized this issue 
and proposed a draft of “Guidance for 
Concession Evaluation of Municipal 
Public Utilities”. The draft proposed 
a four-step investment evaluation 
process, i.e. 1) whether is the proj-
ect worthwhile; 2) should it be done 
using traditional public procurement or 
PPP; and 3) if using PPP, which specific 
model should be adopted; 4) if using a 
specific model, which aspects should 
be and how to be evaluated and per-
formance monitored.
Conclusion
With the continual economic growth 
in China, the increasing need of infra-
structures has been placing budgetary 
pressure on the government. Private 
investors cannot afford to ignore the 
scale of the infrastructure market in 
China. The private sector’s eagerness 
to invest in this market and the public 
sector’s need for private investment 
and higher efficiency will ensure appro-
priate solutions for PPPs to work. This 
paper reviewed the PPP application in 
China. It was found that China has a 
wealth of experience with PPPs, and 
the number of PPP projects will con-
tinue to rise in the future. However, its 
underdeveloped institutional frame-
work and regulatory environment pro-
vide no guarantee of sustainability for 
PPP projects. Investors should align 
their interests with the public sector 
and hence obtain the support from 
subnational governments, especially 
for projects with a weak revenue gen-
erating capability.
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